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Abstract 
The paper describes how to detect malicious executable files based on static 
analysis of their binary content. The stages of pre-processing and cleaning 
data extracted from different areas of executable files are analyzed. Methods 
of encoding categorical attributes of executable files are considered, as are 
ways to reduce the feature field dimension and select characteristic features 
in order to effectively represent samples of binary executable files for further 
training classifiers. An ensemble training approach was applied in order to 
aggregate forecasts from each classifier, and an ensemble of classifiers of 
various feature groups of executable file attributes was created in order to 
subsequently develop a system for detecting malicious files in an uninsulated 
environment. 
Keywords: executable files, static analysis, machine learning, ensemble 
learning. 
Introduction 
In order to frustrate efforts to analyze malware and create signatures to identify 
viruses, the latest viruses are using polymorphism and metamorphism on an increasingly 
frequent basis. This means that the number of variations within malware families is 
constantly growing, which poses a serious problem for the developers of antivirus products.  
Approaches based on searching for signatures in files are no longer effective. They are being 
replaced by the dynamic analysis of malicious code in an isolated environment [1], as well as 
the use of various heuristic detection methods [2]. 
This paper proposes a method for detecting malicious portable executable (PE) files on 
Windows operating systems based on the static analysis of their binary contents. This 
operating system has been chosen due to it immense popularity, which inevitably results in a 
large number of malicious files being created specifically for this OS. 
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There are many approaches to the static analysis of executable files. The most popular 
of them are: byte n-gram analysis [3], classification of file types based on byte frequency 
analysis [4], analysis based on n-grams of opcodes [5,6], analysis based on state machines 
that detect anomalies in the code [7], detection of new malicious files based on string 
attributes [8, 9], classification based on attributes extracted from PE file structure [10]. 
We would like to note that the central stage of the malware detection process is the 
choice of PE file presentation, as well as the generation and selection of informative features. 
At this stage, it is necessary to obtain the fullest representation of the attribute space, which 
facilitates the efficient identification of malicious executables. 
This paper poses the problem of developing a machine learning module that can 
classify PE files as malicious or legitimate with a high level of accuracy before they can run 
in a non-insulated environment.  The most important objective at this stage is minimizing 
type I errors (false positives), caused by an imbalance of file classes (legitimate software 
being more prevalent). The engine design algorithm should not depend on the choice of 
platform on which it will subsequently work in field conditions.  
The dataset being analyzed consists of 716,000 malicious files. It was obtained from 
"Warehouse", which is a centralized repository of malicious files collected by Group-IB 
using its proprietary TDS Polygon tool and third-party sandboxes. A set of 69,100 clean files 
was collected from various versions of Windows OS (Win7-32, Win7-64, and Win10-64), as 
well as by installing the following additional legitimate software: 
 Instant messengers; 
 Remote conference facilities; 
 Office applications from different vendors; 
 ERP and CRM systems; 
 Text editors; 
 Graphical editors; 
 Web browsers; 
 Mail clients; 
 Security tools; 
 Computer games; 
 Antivirus protection tools; 
 Virtualization tools; 
 Servers (DB, mail, etc.) 
1. Data preparation 
Data preparation and cleaning are important tasks that must be completed before the 
dataset can be used to train the model. Raw data is often distorted and unreliable, and some 
values may be missing. The use of raw data in modeling may lead to inaccurate results. 
1.1. The main objectives of data preparation 
If any problems with the dataset are discovered, the data must be prepared and 
cleaned, which often involves removing missing values, normalizing data, discretizing, and 
processing text values to remove or replace embedded characters that can have a negative 
impact on the data type. 
 Data cleaning: filling in missing values, detecting and removing noisy data and 
outliers. 
 Data transformation: normalizing data to reduce volume and noise. 
 Data compaction: selecting a subset of data or attributes to simplify data processing. 
 Data discretization: converting continuous data attribute values into a finite set of 
intervals to facilitate the use of specific machine learning methods. 
1.2. Data cleaning 
When dealing with missing values, the first step that should be taken is to determine 
their cause; this will help in finding a solution to the problem and prevent data with missing 
values from being processed when it is known to be erroneous.   
Methods for processing missing values [11]: 
 Deletion is the simplest and most data-intensive method, whereby the entire record 
with a missing value is deleted.  The main disadvantage of this approach is that if the 
record contains other data in addition to the missing value, then information required 
for training the model is also lost when the record is deleted. 
 Substitution of dummy data involves replacing missing values with dummy ones: for 
example, substituting “unknown” for categorical values, or zeroes for numerical ones. 
 Mean imputation – the missing numerical data can be replaced by the mean of the 
variable value. 
 Most frequently used value imputation – missing categorical values can be replaced by 
the most frequently used value. 
 Regression imputation – use of the regression method to replace missing values with 
regression values. 
The last way of dealing with missing data is worth discussing in more detail. In 
regression analysis, the regression coefficients are essentially calculated based on the 
observed values that do not contain missing data, and the missing value of the dependent 
variable is calculated and restored based on these calculations. [12] 
There are two problems that can be identified in this approach. The first is that due to 
the nature of regression, random fluctuations are excluded completely. This, for example, is 
what causes the same reconstructed values to be imputed into different observations for the 
same set of independent variable values. This means that in datasets with a large percentage 
of cases with missing values, there is a very noticeable bias towards mean values in the 
results. A random imputation method is used in order to compensate for this, where random 
values are added to the calculated value, e.g. taken from the regression equation residuals 
obtained on complete datasets. The second problem is that by using a set of independent 
variables in the regression equation which is too large, we risk modeling noise instead of 
certain meaningful variable values. 
The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method arose from these two problems, 
which is specifically designed for dealing with missing information in large subsets. 
The method is based on the following assumption: what “happened” in the study is 
what should have happened, i.e. the events that actually took place had the highest 
probability for the system under review, and were simultaneously the most relevant to the 
research tool being used. Therefore, all the unknown data that we are trying to recover should 
be sought in such a way that it is in the best possible agreement with the data that is already 
present in the database. This allows "the most plausible" estimates of the missing data to be 
made. 
To use more formal language, we can say that the maximum likelihood estimate of an 
 ̂ unknown parameter   is the point  ̃ at which        a function is maximized (as a function 
of   for fixed        ) 
 ̂        
 
        
where                               ∏       
 
    is called a likelihood function. [13] 
1.3. Data normalization 
Normalizing data means scaling the numerical values into a specified range. The 
following are common data normalization methods. [14] 
Minmax normalization 
Linear data transformation within the range, e.g. from 0 to 1, where the minimum and 
maximum scalable values correspond to 0 and 1, respectively. 
      
      
         
 
Z-score normalization 
Data scaling based on the mean and standard deviation: the difference between data 
point value and mean is divided by the standard deviation.   
      
   
 
 
1.4. Dimensionality reduction 
There are various methods for reducing the dimension of the data space without 
significantly compromising the information content of the dataset.  Dimension reduction not 
only helps speed up model training, but in most cases it also helps filter out some noise and 
unnecessary details, thereby ensuring higher performance. 
In addition to speeding up learning, dimensionality reduction is also extremely useful 
in data visualization. Reducing the number of dimensions to two or three allows high 
dimensionality training sets to be represented graphically, which often offer important 
insights, as they allow patterns such as clusters to be visually detected.  
One of the most popular dimensionality reduction algorithms is Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) [15]. First, it identifies the hyperplane that is closest to the data, and then 
projects the data onto it. 
 Before the training set can be projected onto a hyperplane with fewer dimensions, the 
correct hyperplane needs to be selected. Figure 1 on the left shows a simple two-dimensional 
dataset with three different axes (one-dimensional hyperplanes). On the right, the result of 
projecting the dataset onto each axis is shown. It can be seen that the projection onto the 
solid line preserves the maximum variance of the dataset, while the projection onto the 
dotted line removes the variance almost completely (the projection onto the dashed line 
shows the intermediate value of the preserved variance). 
 
Fig. 1. Choosing a hyperplane for projection 
The correct choice will be the axis that preserves the maximum dispersion, since it is 
likely to lose less information compared to other projections. In other words, this axis will 
minimize the mean square of the distance between the original dataset and its projection onto 
the axis. This is the idea behind the PCA algorithm. 
The algorithm identifies the axis along which the greatest variance is produced in the 
training set. This axis, or rather the unit vector that represents it, will be referred to as the 
first component. Then the algorithm finds the second axis, perpendicular to the first, which 
produces the largest residual dispersion. The third component will be a vector perpendicular 
to both axes found in the previous steps, and preserves the maximum value of the residual 
variance.  In Figure 1, vector    is the first component, and    is the second. 
After identifying all the main components, we can then reduce the dataset dimension 
to d by projecting it onto the hyperplane defined by the first d main components. Using this 
hyperplane ensures that the projection will preserve the maximum possible dispersion as well 
as the information content of the transformed data. 
1.5. Processing text and categorical attributes 
Most machine learning algorithms prefer working with numerical data, thus several 
techniques have been created for converting text data to numerical input. 
 
 Label encoding 
One of these techniques is to encode categorical attributes by matching each category 
with a unique integer. 
In general, this is the only work the encoder has to do. Depending on the data, 
however, this conversion can create a new problem. A connection exists between a set of 
probably non-related categories after they are converted into a set of numbers due to the 
possibility of comparing them with each other.  Machine learning algorithms will assume 
that two numerical values close to each other are more similar than two values which are 
remote from each other. 
One-Hot Encoding 
A common solution to the problem identified above is to create one binary attribute 
per category: one attribute is set to 1 when the category is the string “hello” (0 otherwise), 
another at-tribute is 1 when the category is the word “world” (0 otherwise), etc. This 
technique is called one-hot encoding, as only one attribute value is equal to 1 (hot), while the 
rest have the value of 0 (cold). 
TF-IDF Vectorizer 
When the task involves classification of text documents, the TF-IDF (Term Frequency 
- Inverse Document Frequency) algorithm is often used to determine the importance of a 
word for a specific document relative to other documents. [16] 
If a term is used frequently in a certain text, but rarely in others, then it has higher 
significance for this text.  If the term is used quite frequently in all documents in the set, then 
the significance of such a term will be low after processing. 
As the name of the algorithm suggests, the statistical measure used to assess the 
significance of a word consists of two parts:   
1) TF (term frequency), the ratio of the number of occurrences of a word to the total 
number of words in the document. In this way, the significance of the word    
within a single document is evaluated. 
        
  
∑    
   
where    is the number of occurrences of the word   in the document, and the 
denominator is the total number of words in this document. 
2) IDF (inverse document frequency) is the inverse value of the frequency with which 
a specific word occurs in documents within the collection.  Accounting for IDF 
reduces the weight of commonly used words (in Russian, these would include parts 
of speech such as interjections, conjunctions, particles, and other noise). There is 
only one IDF value for each unique word within a particular collection of 
documents. [17] 
            
   
             
   
where |D| is the number of documents in the collection, and               is the 
number of documents from collection    , in which   occurs. [18] 
The choice of the logarithm base in the     formula is insignificant, as changing the 
base leads to a change in the weight of each word by a constant factor, which does not affect 
the ratio of weights. 
Thus, the TF-IDF measure is the product of two factors: 
                              
2. Construction of classifiers 
In order to build a machine learning model capable of classifying data with a high 
level of accuracy, it is necessary to generate a large field of features and select informative 
data from this dataset. 
2.1. Feature generation and selection 
The methods of feature selection have been studied rather thoroughly, and there are 
many algorithms for this task. However, feature generation is a rather meticulous process 
(Fig. 2), more of an art than a science, which involves extracting a set of meaningful features 
from a large, non-normalized collection of data, most of which tends to carry an excessive 
amount of information, which should reflect the data structure well and make a positive 
contribution to the classification of this data. 
 Fig. 2. Feature generation process 
It is worth noting that this particular task is often the most difficult, and obtaining 
machine learning algorithms of a very high quality depends on the successful selection and 
creation of features.  
Categorical features 
Let us assume that objects have a feature that can have values from a specific finite set.  
For example, a colour may be red, green, blue, or its value may be unknown.  In this case, it 
may be useful to add features such as "unknown", "is_red", "is_green", "is_blue", 
"is_red_or_blue", and other possible combinations. 
Numeric variables 
If the variable value is a real number, it often helps to round or split it into the entier 
and fractional parts. You can also convert a numerical feature into a categorical one.  For 
example, if one feature is speed, then other features may be introduced such as the 
formulations “speed is greater than X”, “speed is between X and Y”, “speed is greater than 
Y”, which will generalize the feature and increase its information content. 
Aggregated Attributes 
It is practical to add features that aggregate a set of features for a certain object, 
thereby reducing the dimension of the feature space.  As a rule, this is useful in tasks where 
objects contain several parameters of the same type. For example, a carmaker that produces 
vehicles with different engine powers.  In this case, you can consider features that correspond 
to high, low, and average engine power to determine which type of cars the company 
manufactures (e.g. sports or city cars). 
Results obtained using other algorithms 
It is often possible to introduce a result obtained using other algorithms as a feature. 
For example, if we are dealing with a classification problem, we can first solve the auxiliary 
clustering problem, and then use the cluster to which the object belongs as a feature in the 
initial problem. This is usually performed based on the initial data analysis in cases when the 
objects are well clustered. 
Adding new features 
This point relates to practical tasks from real life. In order to build a high-quality 
machine learning model, it is often necessary to have subject-specific expertise and an 
understanding of what affects the target variable. Returning to our example of determining 
the category of a car, everyone knows that sports cars have far greater engine power than city 
cars. In a more complex subject area, however, it may be more difficult to arrive at these 
kinds of conclusions. 
2.2. Collecting data from an executable file 
The first task here is to implement modules for parsing a binary file and extracting data 
from its structure.  
The code is written in Python and uses the “pefile” library to extract data from the 
structure of an executable file. [19] 
To conduct the study, 40,000 legitimate executable files were collected from the 
Windows operating system, and 40,000 malicious executables were obtained using the 
company's traffic filtering systems. 
Sets of different types of attributes are collected from each file, which are shown in 
Table 1 with descriptions. 
Table 1. Attributes collected from the executables 
Attributes Description 
dense_features 
Numeric attributes such as section 
sizes, file footprint, number of 
libraries, number of characters 
imported, etc. 
strings All ASCII strings in the file 
urls 
URLs found in the strings using 
regular expressions 
manifest 
An .xml document (manifest) 
containing information about the file 
name, company, software description, 
library versions, and other metadata 
imports 
A set of features extracted from the 
import table in the following format: 
[library name, the group of functions 
within this library, function name, 
presence of suspicion] 
exports 
A set of features extracted from the 
export table in the following format: 
[the name of exported function] 
resources 
A set of features extracted from the 
resource directory table in the 
following format: [type, name, 
language] 
blacklisted strings 
A set of strings considered suspicious 
by malware analysts in the following 
format: [type, language] 
tls 
This table contains a description of the 
static variables relating to a thread 
local storage (TLS). TLS is a 
Windows-specific method of storing 
data in which a data object is not a 
stack variable but is nevertheless local 
to each separate thread. As a result, 
each thread has its own instance of data 
located in TLS. A set of attributes in 
the following format: 
[AddressOfCallBacks] 
relocations 
Information from the address settings 
table in the following format: [initial 
RVA, setting type, block size in bytes] 
 
 
2.3. The choice of metrics for assessment of classifiers 
In the simplest example, the classification quality assessment metric could be the 
percentage of files which the classifier has classified correctly. This type of metric is referred 
to as Accuracy in machine learning, and its formula is: 
         
     
   
  
where TP is the number of malicious files correctly identified by the classifier, TN is the 
number of legitimate files correctly identified by the classifier, and ALL is the entire sample.  
[20] 
In order to assess the quality of the classifier, the metrics of precision and recall are 
introduced separately for each class.  The classifier's precision within a class is the 
percentage of objects that truly belong to a given class in the entire set of objects that the 
system has assigned to that class. The classifier's recall is the ratio of the number of a given 
class objects found by the classifier to the entire number of the objects of that class in the test 
set. 
Clearly, the higher the precision and recall of the classifier, the better. In real life 
however, maximum precision and maximum recall cannot be achieved at the same time, so it 
is necessary to find an acceptable tradeoff between these two metrics. The F-measure is 
normally used as a metric that combines information about the precision and recall of an 
algorithm, the formula for which is: 
        
                
                  
    
where   takes a value in the       range if priority is given to precision, and     if 
the priority is given to recall. [21] 
As an example, see the graph of the F-measure with the priority given to precision 
(β=0.5) in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. F-measure with the priority given to precision (   
 
 
) 
For the specific problem considered in this paper, it is necessary to take into account 
that the classifier will come across legitimate files in the majority of cases when working 
with real data. Therefore, it is first and foremost necessary to monitor the recall on the 
legitimate file class, i.e. to avoid type I errors (false positives). At the same time, the reason 
the classifier exists is so that malware can be identified. Therefore, the type II error (failure 
to identify a target) will be used as the second parameter in the final metric. A function 
follows from the above, which is a combination of type I and type II errors.  
The error minimization function, the coefficients in which were selected empirically, is 
as follows: 
   
  
     
    
  
     
       
where 
 TN is the number of correctly classified legitimate files, 
 FP is the number of false positives (type I errors), 
 TP is the number of correctly classified malicious files, 
 FN is the number of failures to identify the target (false negatives, type II errors). 
2.4. Numeric attribute classifier 
The first and perhaps the most important classifier is that trained based on numerical 
features extracted from the binary structure of an executable file and enriched with the 
features generated when examining the PE file structure and indicators described by malware 
analysts. 
Standard numerical features extracted from an executable file by this module with 
descriptions are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Standard numerical features of a PE file 
Feature Description 
check_sum File checksum 
compile_date Build date 
debug_size Debug directory size 
export_size Export table size 
iat_rva Import table RVA 
major_version Major version of the builder 
minor_version Minor version of the file 
number_of_imports Number of imported libraries 
number_of_import_symbols Number of imported symbols 
number_of_export_symbols 
Number of exported symbols (usually 
subroutines and variables from DLLs) 
number_of_bound_import_symbols 
Number of symbols in the static import 
binding table 
number_of_bound_imports 
Number of libraries in the import 
binding table 
number_of_rva_and_sizes 
Number of descriptors and data 
directories 
number_of_sections Number of sections 
total_size_pe Physical size of the binary PE file 
virtual_address RVA of the first section in memory 
virtual_size The size of the first section in memory 
virtual_size_2 
The size of the second section in 
memory 
datadir_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENT
RY_BASERELOC_size 
Physical size of the relocation table 
datadir_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENT
RY_RESOURCE_size 
Physical size of the resource table 
datadir_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENT
RY_IAT_size 
Physical size of import address table 
(IAT) 
datadir_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENT
RY_IMPORT_size 
Physical size of import table 
datadir_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENT
RY_EXPORT_size 
Physical size of export table 
pe_char File attributes 
pe_dll The file is a library (0 or 1) 
pe_driver The file is a driver (0 or 1) 
pe_exe The file extension is .exe (0 or 1) 
pe_i386 The processor is i386 (0 or 1) 
pe_majorlink Major version of the builder 
pe_minorlink Minor version of the builder 
size_code 
The total size of all sections containing 
code 
size_image 
The footprint of the file, including all 
headers 
size_initdata 
The total size of all sections containing 
initialized data 
size_uninit 
The total size of all sections containing 
uninitialized data 
We are attempting to train the classifier based on these attributes and test it using the 
K-fold validation method on five blocks. 
Cross-validation is a model validation technique to check how well the model works 
on an independent dataset using the given statistical analysis and training set. [12] Cross-
validation is typically used in forecast problems, and the predictive model would ideally be 
evaluated in field conditions. 
One cross-validation cycle for K blocks involves splitting the dataset into parts, then 
building the model using one part (called the training set), and validating it on the other part 
(called the test set).  To reduce variation in the results, several cross-validation cycles are 
performed using different ways of splitting the initial dataset, and the validation results are 
averaged over all cycles. 
 
Fig. 4. Cross-validation on K blocks 
In Figure 4, the initial dataset is divided into K (in this case, K=5) blocks of equal size. 
One of the K blocks is set aside to test the model, and the remaining K-1 blocks are used as a 
training set. The process is repeated K times, with each block only used as a test set once. 
One K result is obtained for each block, which are then averaged or combined in another way 
to produce a single estimate. 
Before training the classifier, we will try to visually evaluate the sample by using the t-
SNE dimensionality reduction algorithm [23], which basically models high-dimensional 
objects with two- or three-dimensional points in a Euclidean space, so that similar objects are 
modeled with points located close to each other, while dissimilar objects are likely to be 
modeled with points set far apart from each other. As can be seen from Figure 5, malicious 
samples mostly overlap with legitimate executables, which indicates an inadequate selection 
of features. 
Let us use the Random Forest algorithm for classification, proven to be the most 
effective in the field of machine learning. [24] The implementation of this algorithm is 
available in the scikit-learn machine learning library [25]. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Visualization of standard numerical features of a PE file 
An average assessment of the model quality using 5-fold cross-validation according to 
the metric selected in Section 2.3 yielded 0.08048. In this case, the threshold at which the 
loss function reaches this minimum is 0.74 (Fig. 6). This means that all samples with 
forecasts above this threshold value are malicious, and all files with forecasts below this 
threshold are legitimate. 
 
Fig. 6. Loss function graph from section 2.3 
The selected features show that this dataset has proved to be effective. The recall on 
malware class files is 0.746 and the recall on benign class files is 0.959 (i.e. 95.9% of all 
clean files are identified correctly). 
The researchers sought to add features that could increase data separability and 
contribute to the classification. Some of the added features/ groups of features are given in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Generated numeric features of a PE file 
Feature Description 
std_sections_names 
Whether all section names are standard 
(.text, .data, .bss, .reloc, .rsrc etc.) 
generated_check_sum Generated checksum 
entropy_sec_mean Mean entropy of all sections 
entropy_sec_std 
Standard deviation of the entropy of all 
sections 
sec_entropy_* 
Entropy of standard sections (a name is 
substituted instead of *, for example 
sec_entropy_text) 
known_sections_number 
Number of sections with standard names 
(.text, .data, .bss, .reloc, .rsrc, etc.) 
unknown_sections_number 
Number of sections with non-standard 
names 
known_sections_pr 
The percentage of sections with standard 
names out of the total number of sections 
unknown_sections_pr 
The percentage of sections with non-
standard names out of the total number of 
sections 
*_entropy_sec_mean 
Mean entropy for a certain type of 
section (e.g. writable sections 
MEM_WRITE or sections containing 
executable code CNT_CODE) 
*_entropy_sec_std 
Standard deviation of the entropy for 
a specific type of section 
rawsize_sec_mean Mean size of all sections in a file 
vasize_sec_mean Average swap size for all sections 
std_sections_names 
Whether all section names are 
standard (.text, .data, .bss, .reloc, .rsrc etc.) 
generated_check_sum Generated checksum 
entropy_sec_mean Mean entropy of all sections 
entropy_sec_std 
Standard deviation of the entropy of 
all sections 
sec_entropy_* 
Entropy of standard sections (a name 
is substituted instead of *, for example 
sec_entropy_text) 
known_sections_number 
Number of sections with standard 
names (.text, .data, .bss, .reloc, .rsrc, etc.) 
unknown_sections_number 
Number of sections with non-standard 
names 
known_sections_pr 
The percentage of sections with 
standard names out of the total number of 
sections 
unknown_sections_pr 
The percentage of sections with non-
standard names out of the total number of 
sections 
*_entropy_sec_mean 
Mean entropy for a certain type of 
section (e.g. writable sections 
MEM_WRITE or sections containing 
executable code CNT_CODE) 
*_entropy_sec_std 
Standard deviation of the entropy for 
a specific type of section 
rawsize_sec_mean Mean size of all sections in a file 
vasize_sec_mean Average swap size for all sections 
std_sections_names 
Whether all section names are 
standard (.text, .data, .bss, .reloc, .rsrc etc.) 
generated_check_sum Generated checksum 
entropy_sec_mean Mean entropy of all sections 
entropy_sec_std 
Standard deviation of the entropy of 
all sections 
sec_entropy_* 
Entropy of standard sections (a name 
is substituted instead of *, for example 
sec_entropy_text) 
known_sections_number 
Number of sections with standard 
names (.text, .data, .bss, .reloc, .rsrc, etc.) 
unknown_sections_number 
Number of sections with non-standard 
names 
known_sections_pr 
The percentage of sections with 
standard names out of the total number of 
sections 
The sample may now be re-visualized using the t-SNE algorithm after reducing the 
dimensionality of the feature space to two-dimensional Euclidean space. Figure 7 shows that 
the clusters now stand out much more clearly than in the previous experiment, which 
indicates that there will be good results at the testing stage for the new classifier. 
After training and testing the classifier, the loss function value dropped to 0.06153. 
The percentage of malware that was correctly detected (malware recall) increased from 
74.63% to 88.12%, while the optimal threshold (where the loss function is minimal) moved 
closer to 0, dropping to 0.628. This indicates a better separation of the sample compared to 
the previous result.  
 Fig. 7. Data visualization including new numerical features 
The 50 most informative features selected by the classifier and sorted by importance 
can be plotted as a histogram. Apart from standard features, such as the date the file was 
compiled (compile_date) and the size of the data directory with debugging information 
(debug_size), the newly generated features also make the top 50. The list of leading features 
includes the generated checksum, the mean entropy of sections with initialized data, the 
standard deviation of section entropy, the mean footprint of sections with initialized data, and 
many others. 
 
Fig. 8. Histogram of the informativeness of numerical features 
The trained classifier showed the best result for the selected loss metric (0.05904) on 
the first 50 significant features shown in Figure 8. The recall on clean files also increased 
significantly (to 0.961), while we did not sacrifice the share of detecting malicious files from 
the total number (86.26%). 
Looking at the visualization of the new feature space (Fig. 9), it is easy to see that the 
number of samples creating noise and polluting clusters of other classes has decreased.  This 
allows the conclusion to be made that using strictly informative features eliminates the 
excess noise that interferes with classification, which enables the classifier to build better 
forecasts. 
 
Fig. 9. Visualization of the feature space for informative features 
Let us add indicators written by malware analysts to the attribute space of our 
classifier: 
 Digital certificate is used which is not valid 
 Entrypoint in section <.section_name> which is not executable 
 Entrypoint is in last section 
 The age of the debug file is suspicious 
 The count of imports is suspicious 
 The debug file name extension is suspicious 
 The dos-stub is missing 
 The executable contains some default passwords 
 The executable has a lot of executable sections 
 The executable has section(s) that are both executable and writable 
 The file has been compiled with Delphi 
 The file has blacklisted section name(s) 
 The file has no Manifest 
 The file ignores Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
 The file ignores Data Execution Prevention (DEP) 
 The file ignores Structured Exception Handling (SEH) 
 The file ignores cookies on the stack (GS) 
 The file implements Control Flow Guard (CFG) 
 The file imports suspicious number of anti-debug function(s) 
 The file is a Device Driver 
 The file is code-less 
 The file is resource-less 
 The file opts for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
 The file opts for Data Execution Prevention (DEP) 
 The file opts for cookies on the stack (GS) 
 The file references a debug symbols file 
 The file references keyboard functions 
 The file references keyboard keys like a Keylogger 
 The file-ratio of the resources is suspicious 
 The first section is writable 
 The last section is executable 
 The shared section(s) reached the max threshold 
 The size of code is bigger than the size of code sections 
 The size of initialized data reached the max threshold 
 The size of the optional-header is suspicious 
 The value of 'SizeOfImage' is suspicious 
After the training, in addition to numerical features, the following indicators (listed in 
descending order of their informativeness) were included in the top 50 most informative 
indicators: 
1. The file ignores Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR),  
2. The file references a debug symbols file, 
3. The file opts for Data Execution Prevention (DEP), 
4. The file opts for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), 
5. The debug file name extension is suspicious, 
6. The file ignores Data Execution Prevention (DEP). 
 
Fig. 10. Histogram of the informativeness of numerical features with adding indicators 
The following results were obtained during validation of the classifier: 
 Recall on clean files: 0.997 
 The percentage of correctly identified malicious files increased to 98.53% 
 The threshold value is 0.77 
 The value of the loss function reached at the selected threshold decreased by 
more than 25 times compared to the previous results and amounted to 0.002318 
The result shows that often, in order to build a high-quality machine learning model, 
you need to be an expert in a specific field and understand what affects the target metric. In 
the case being analyzed, the quality of classification was greatly influenced by the indicators 
described by malware analysts. 
2.5. String-based classifier 
Developing a classifier based on ASCII strings extracted from a binary file involves 
several stages:   
1) ASCII strings are extracted from different areas of the binary file and collected 
in one array 
2) All strings from the array are concentrated into a single string (adding a space 
be-tween them) 
3) A set of such strings is generated for the entire training set 
4) The strings are processed using the tf-idf algorithm described earlier using the 
stop_words dictionary for the English language, and the 5,000 most informative 
strings are selected. This is done in order to remove noise and speed up model 
train-ing, as there is often 100,000 or more strings in the binary files. 
5) The set of features with the assigned weights (calculated using the tf-idf 
algorithm) is passed from the scikit-learn library to RandomForestClassifier. 
The loss function showed 0.02361 at a threshold of 0.68, which is slightly higher than 
that of the classifier using numerical attributes. The percentage of malware detection was 
94.02%, the completeness on benign files was 0.985. 
Let us construct a histogram of the first 50 informative lines (Fig. 11). 
 Fig. 11. The histogram of string informativeness 
The "pdb" string turned out to be the most informative one. This type of file contains 
the program database, which is a proprietary file format for storing debugging information 
about a program module.  The presence of symbol files (.pdb) on the client machine can be 
useful, as more detailed information about the exception can be obtained from a .pdb file if 
an unhandled exception occurs.  These files are rarely found in malware, as malware aims to 
give the virus analyst as little useful information as possible. 
Let us test this hypothesis. In order to do so, each of the informative strings will be 
assigned to one of the classes (Table 4). A string is considered characteristic for a specific 
class if the ratio of the number of class samples containing this string to the number of all 
samples containing this string exceeds 0.7. Thus, the "pdb" string identified by the classifier 
as the most important feature does indeed indicate that the code is legitimate, which confirms 
that the classifier works. 
Table 4. Informative strings for each software class 
Malware Legitimate software 
exitprocess, loadlibrarya, getmodulehandlea, 
gdi32, mg, findfirstfilea, virtualalloc, qa, 
virtualfree, createfilea, form, aw, kz, ao, lv, 
getcommandlinea, aj, rtlunwind, vb, qe, fn, 
vi, ke, sf, createprocessa, jl, jq, 
setfilepointer, lp, ia, dz, eb, yn, kg, 
messageboxa, getstartupinfoa, 
getforegroundwindow, gn, ma, p7, 
deletefilea, svwuj, fs, wsprintfa, suvw, ar, 
hn, wininet, kk, jb, og, fw, wc, ec, yp, jg, sn, 
nz, nm, dispatchmessagea, ow, getcpinfo, 
lstrcpya, regsetvalueexa, getfileattributesa, 
getwindowtexta, uj, mw, wa, gettemppatha, 
7o, kj, i_, setwindowpos, yo, cb, yx, yg, 
defwindowproca, fv, qc, nx, qz, bg, ov, nt, 
gq, zb, jo, xg, comctl32, wq, ki, ox, zw, nq, 
i7, lb, cz, o2, 6p, qg, postquitmessage, nn, 
ea, sendmessagea, pppppppp, setstdhandle, 
getsystemdirectorya, createwindowexa, qk, 
mt, ga, nc, mp, interlockeddecrement, 
lstrlena, iswindowenabled, qb, er, oe, ns, ze, 
ne, 700wp, lstrcmpia, onpf, 
managed_vector_copy_constructor_iterator, 
wn, ek, wo, vector_deleting_destructor, za, 
nw, __ptr64, 6z, bj, uqpxy, settimer, sy, cg, 
wk, fgiu, f3, zp, sssss, d2, sd, beginpaint, yq, 
ng, __pascal, wb, interlockedincrement, 
findnextfilea, placement_delete, getdc, 
dynamic_initializer_for_, opc, lz, 
getlastactivepopup. 
pdb, zzzdbg, rsa1, _initterm, _amsg_exit, 
_cordllmain, rsds, module, guid, crt, 
rtllookupfunctionentry, blob, memset, 
lsystem, xca, idata, edata, bsjb, malloc, 
_culture, core, _unlock, neutral, gctl, api, 
00cfg, rdata, rtlvirtualunwind, bss, 
_mscorlib, _purecall, rtlcapturecontext, 
_except_handler4_common, resources, 
b77a5c561934e089, xdata, _a_a, 30319, 
xia, gfids, win, _lock, brc, 
disablethreadlibrarycalls, 
__cxxframehandler3, _vsnwprintf, 
memcpy, 0e3, microsoft_corporation, 
resourcereader, a_a, mscoree, 
uvwatauavawh, xiz, uvwh, terminate, 
watauavawh, _microsoft_corporation, 
runtimeresourceset, xe3, _e3, 0a_a, 
dllgetclassobject, lca, pdata, _initterm_e, 
8e3, pa_a, yaxxz, xcz, fd9, 
__c_specific_handler, dllcanunloadnow, 
_xcptfilter, processthreads, pe3, 
assemblyproductattribute, 
assemblyfileversionattribute, _watauavawh, 
debuggableattribute, padpadp, memmove, 
_uvwatauavawh, _wcsicmp, 
_cxxthrowexception, runtime, 
debuggingmodes, ilist, libraryloader, xcu, 
_copyright_, ha_a, _h3e_h3e, 
assemblycopyrightattribute, svwatauavawh, 
uatauavawh, usvwatauavawh, xiaa. 
 2.6. URL-based classifier 
Similarly to the previous classifier, we will build a classifier that can detect malware 
based on information about URLs stored among other ASCII strings collected from a binary 
file. 
The only difference between the construction of this classifier from the previous one is 
that this time the tf-idf algorithm analyzes 5-grams of characters extracted from URLs 
instead of words. Each sample is a string of URLs separated by a space. Note that when an 5-
gram overlaps the end of a URL, the 5-gram is padded with white spaces instead of including 
a part of the next URL. 
The 5-fold cross-validation found that the mean minimum value of the loss function 
achieved at the threshold value of 0.71 is equal to 0.0615. The recall for legitimate files is 
0.986, and the recall on malware is 0.901. 
 
Fig. 12. Histogram of the first 50 informative 5-gram URLs 
Table 5 lists the n-grams characteristic for a particular type of software. 
Table 5. Informative n-grams for each software class 
Malware Legitimate software 
` / `, `fc/co`, `.php `, `f.net`, `okie_`, 
`s.sf.`, `ec.ht`, ` nsis`, ` /rfc`, ` curl`, `.net 
`, `haxx.`, `s_err`, `x.se `, ` /nsi`, `sis.s`, 
`is_er`, `.haxx`, `ookie`, `_erro`, `e_spe`, 
`sis_e`, `/cook`, `rror `, `c.htm`, `_spec`, 
`curl.`, `ie_sp`, `is.sf`, `url.h`, `c/coo`, 
`l.hax`, `bsens`, `spec.`, `sf.ne`, `rfc/c`, 
`nsis_`, `nsis.`, `www.i`, `pec.h`, ` %s `, 
`.sf.n`, `rl.ha`, `/nsis`, `error`, `ftwar`, 
`oftwa`, `xx.se`, `tware`, `gnlog`, 
`ware.`, `axx.s`, `ww.go`, `ww.ib`, 
`erts/`, `re.co`, `ogle.`, `le.co`, ` /%s `, 
`kie_s`, `.goog`, `e.php`, `.ibse`, `w.ibs`, 
`oogle`, `/inde`, ` /pki`, `.crl0`, `ndex.`, 
`i/crl`, `gle.c`, `ensof`, `te.ph`, `index`, 
`lp/in`, `softw`, `gin.r`, ` crl.`, `a.com`, 
`in.ru`, `%s:80`, ` %s:8`, `pki/c`, `are.o`, 
`jrsof`, `googl`, `ownth`, `c.com`, `.crt0`, 
`%s:%d`, `/ishe`, `/rfc/`, `ate.p`, `are.c`, 
`s:80 `, `n.ru `, `dmin/`, `raut_`, `arch.`, 
`that.`, `senso`, `elp/i`, `w.goo`, `cerau`, 
`ishel`, ` butt`, `rl/pr`, `at.co`, ` %s:%`, 
`cooki`, `gate.`, `.exe `, `nthat`, `ll/ga`, 
`s/mic`, `-06-2`, `ibsen`, ` i2.t`, `rsoft`, ` 
gnlo`, `p/ind`, `/gate`, `butte`, `ki/ce`, 
`www.j`, `hoco.`, `ex.ph`, `.com0`, 
`min/b`, ` /ish`, `.jrso`, `crt0 `, `shelp`, 
`etmas`, `dex.p`, `n/bul`, `wntha`, 
`oft.c`, `icros`, `.micr`, `croso`, `ft.co`, 
`osoft`, `rosof`, `micro`, `emas.`, 
`go.mi`, ` /fwl`, ` go.m`, `fwlin`, `hema 
`, `wlink`, `mas.m`, `/fwli`, ` /200`, 
`ation`, `s.mic`, `link/`, `ink/ `, `as.mi`, 
`o.mic`, `hemas`, `hub.c`, `.com)`, ` 
sche`, `/xml/`, `ithub`, `githu`, `/winf`, 
`pport`, `names`, ` ' `, `thub.`, `xamar`, 
`nfx/2`, `l/199`, `/xmls`, ` /dot`, 
`/1998`, `2000/`, `amesp`, `otnet`, 
`/core`, ` loca`, `fx/20`, `xmlsc`, 
`mlsch`, `mespa`, `marin`, `/xaml`, 
`ml/19`, `host `, `w.xam`, `/2001`, 
`x/200`, `ocalh`, `com) `, `xml/1`, 
`senta`, `ub.co`, `calho`, ` /xml`, 
`01/xm`, `trans`, ` gith`, `in.co`, 
`.xama`, `ww.xa`, `uppor`, `dotne`, 
`lhost`, `/2000`, `espac`, `006/x`, 
`8/nam`, `refx/`, `p.org`, `2001/`, 
`amari`, `98/na`, `xaml `, `alhos`, `a.ms 
`, `prese`, `1/xml`, `tree/`, `/pres`, 
`.avir`, `resen`, `local`, `rin.c`, `vira.`, 
`lsche`, `aka.m`, `nses/`, `001/x`, 
`orefx`, `suppo`, `/dotn`, ` aka.`, 
`06/xa`, `licen`, `t/cor`, `cense`, `es/gp`, 
`tnet/`, `999/x`, `ty.co`, `/name`, 
`avira`, `www.x`, `/2006`, `ntati`, 
`ity.c`, `00/xm`, `l.htm`, `enses`, 
`re.or`, `lc.co`, `i/cer`, `ts/mi`, `nsoft`, 
`2011_`, `ww.jr`, `x.php`, `_2010`, 
`ocsp.`, `.down`, `253.6`, `0-06-`, 
`o.net`, `tm0@ `, `ercho`, `w.php`, 
`%d%s `, `utter`, `ww.ne`, `w.net`, ` 
bi.d`, `choco`, `3.crl`, `rchoc`, `tterc`, 
`2010-`, `53.6 `, `ersll`, `d.php`, `nlogi`, 
`w.jrs`, `3.crt`, `llc.c`, `124.2`, `odesi`, 
`.netm`, `crl0z`, ` /rpa`, ` 124.`, 
`s:%d%`, ` ocsp`, `aut_2`, `h.php`, 
`rl.mi`, `4.217`, `ingca`, `ank/d`, `i.dow`, 
`.253.`, `dupe.`, `:%d%s`, `.com:`, 
`7.253`, `bull/`, `/cps0`, `ia.co`, `crl0a`, 
`tmast`, `11_20`, `in/bu`, `t.php`, `sters`, 
`/bull`, `.site`, `cure.`, `_2011`, `l/pro`, 
`/domo`, `terch`, `opca2`, `27:33`, 
`eraut`, `011-1`, `ull/g`, `etea.`, `gca.c`, 
`upe.p`, `co.ne`, `mping`, `eyout`, 
`sign.`, `out.p`, `rl0z `, ` /lsb`, `rsllc`, 
`ki/cr`, `om:44`, `/lsba`, `czban`, `6-23.`, 
`com0 `, `sllc.`, ` /cps`, `load.`, `tampi`, 
`u.com`, `ets.c`, `/admi`, `bi.do`, `p.ver`, 
`24.21`, `crl.v`, `ayme.`, ` i3.t`, `bank.`, 
`how.p`, `w.ver`, `ww.ve`, `/mcy.`, 
`/dupe`, `pc/ch`, `x.htm`, `gn.co`, 
`eb2a.`, `rpa0 `, `ts.co`, `gamet`, 
`money`, `33355`, `netma`, `.baid`, 
`ign.c`, ` /nbb`, `d.com`, `tss-c`, `oco.n` 
`mlns/`, `servi`, `arin.`, `compa`, 
`net/c`, `ka.ms`, `et/co`, `ernam`, 
`6/xam`, `.acro`, `name `, `s.org`, `lns/ 
`, `x/tre`, `s/gpl`, `icens`, `space`, 
`ction`, ` /win`, `i.org`, `port `, `/tree`, 
`000/0`, `m.org`, `pace `, `right`, 
`xmlns`, `u.org`, `ffice`, `l/pre`, 
`1998/`, `rname`, `-comp`, `ressi`, ` 
/exp`, `ml/pr`, `mlfor`, `nu.or`, `coref`, 
`gpl.h`, `.dtd `, `winfx`, `openx`, `link 
`, `ses/g`, `ibili`, `esent`, ` logi`, 
`xaml/`, `a.net`, `/lice`, `direc`, `9/xsl`, 
`nuget`, `efx/t`, ` /lic`, `ports`, `ority`, 
`in.wi`, ` gnu.`, `nd/20`, `irect`, `gnu.o`, 
`forma`, `et.or`, `get.o`, `sl/tr`, `/xmln`, 
`fx/tr`, `ww.gn`, `ssues`, `lsoap`, 
`ira.c`, `.gnu.`, `ldsig`, `as.op`, 
`commo`, `09/xm`, `bug.c`, `ratio`, 
`00/09`, `ows.n`, `lp/> `, ` /net`, 
`eserv`, `eskto`, `uget.`, `port.`, `pl.ht`, 
`/xsl/`, `.nuge`, `infor`, `tatio`, `nslat`, 
`a.org`, `ww.av`, `ws.ne`, `sions`, 
`sktop`, `offic`, `nfigu`, `essio`, 
`ww.co`, `eview`, `patib`, `xmlso`, 
`nform`, `/sql/`, `ww.ad`, `/09/x`, `form 
`, ` /sql`, ` /con`, `ware/`, `ectio`, 
`998/n`, `oap.o`, `illa.`, `ra.co`, `lity/`, 
`d/200`, `xmlfo`, `.wind`, `issue` 
2.7. Classifiers based on categorical attributes 
Another type of classifier is a classifier based on categorical attributes. In cases where 
each attribute is a feature of a particular category, the most practical approach is to encode 
each category's set of attributes using the one-hot encoding technique discussed earlier. This 
will produce a vector of features, each of which is equal to 1 if this attribute is present in the 
file, and 0 if that is not the case. 
This section will describe the construction of such a classifier based on data from the 
resource directory table. This classifier displayed the best results out of all the rest (classifiers 
based on manifests, on the import and export tables, on data from tls and relocations, and on 
strings that are considered suspicious were also built and tested). 
Classifier based on data from the resource directory table 
The classifier is developed as follows: 
1. The feature sets are extracted from the resource table: names of libraries, library 
function groups (if the group is unknown, the value is set to “undefined”), the 
names of the imported functions and whether a given function is suspicious 
(information about suspicious functions was taken from commercial pestudio 
software [26]).   
2. Each feature is sorted according to the set of feature types, and is included in the 
corresponding vector. 
3. Vectors with feature sets are encoded using the “one-hot encoding” technique 
described earlier. 
4. All data is run through the pre-trained OneHotEncoder class and converted into 
vectors, each element of which encodes an attribute. This element contains a 
number, which represents the number of times this attribute was encountered in 
the file. 
5. Feature space is reduced using the PCA algorithm, preserving 99% of the 
original variance. This way, excess noise is removed, classifier training speed is 
increased, and the memory footprint reduced. 
6. The training dataset with reduced dimensionality of features is passed to 
RandomForestClassifier. 
Initially, the resulting feature dimensionality for a training dataset of 2010 elements 
was equal to 15150, and after dimensionality reduction preserving 99% of the initial 
dispersion, it dropped to just 58. 
It should be noted that at this stage, extraction of informative features is a futile 
process, as the classifier did not work with the original features, but with their compacted 
presentation.  The only thing that can be done is a visual evaluation of the data quality by 
projecting the attribute space onto a two-dimensional plane using the t-SNE algorithm (Fig. 
13).   
 
Fig. 13. Feature space visualization for the import table categorical attributes 
The 5-fold cross-validation showed that the mean minimum value of the loss function 
is equal to 0.03226, which is much better than that of other models built on the same 
principle but using different data. This value is achieved with a threshold value of 0.80. The 
recall on legitimate files is 0.986, and percentage of malware detection is 89.94%. 
3. Constructing an ensemble 
It is widely acknowledged that the winners of many machine learning competitions 
have used several ensemble methods (the most famous ones are from the competition [27]).  
An analogy can be used to explain why ensemble learning is better than single models. 
Suppose we asked thousands of random people a question, and then aggregated their 
answers. In many cases, this type of aggregated answer is better than an answer provided by 
a person with subject-specific expertise. This is called the wisdom of the crowd. Similarly, if 
we aggregate the forecasts given by a group of several different predictors (which is called an 
ensemble), we will often get better forecasts than those obtained from the best individual 
predictor [28]. Moreover, if we aggregate forecasts from predictors, each of which is tailored 
to its own feature space, then a much larger and more informative feature space will be 
covered than the feature space of each individual predictor. 
Guided by this idea, we can build a classifier that combines all the classifiers that have 
been built before it. It will aggregate the forecasts of all classifiers and predict the class with 
the highest class probability averaged over all individual classifiers.  
This method is called a soft voting classifier. This ensembling approach often achieves 
greater efficiency than hard voting, whereby the class that received the largest number of 
votes is chosen (hard voting classifier), because more weight is given to votes from 
classifiers with high confidence. 
The weight of each classifier in the constructed ensemble is inversely proportional to 
the value of the loss function achieved at the stage of testing the classifier, and normalized so 
that the sum of the weights of all classifiers gives 1:  
                         
∑                           
 
   
 
Table 6. Weights of trained classifiers in the ensemble 
dense 0.1443 
strings 0.1355 
urls 0.0990 
resources 0.1152 
imports 0.1233 
manifest 0.0744 
relocations 0.0965 
blacklisted 0.0772 
tls 0.1345 
If there is a classification failure for a particular classifier (e.g. no URL was found in 
the PE file), the ensemble does not take this classifier into account when making the final 
decision. 
The ensemble was validated using a dataset consisting of 19,100 clean files and 
676,000 malicious files. Among the malicious files, 611,434 were correctly identified, the 
refusal to classify (when for some reason it was not possible to open/extract data from the 
PE-file) amounted to 55,790 malicious files, and the goal skips were, respectively, 8,776. 
Among the clean files, 28 files were false positives, which is 0.15 of all clean files in the 
dataset. 
The training resulted in achieving better performance indicators compared to 
individual classifiers.  The recall on legitimate files reached 0.9985, and the recall on 
malicious files increased to 0.9858, which is higher than that of the strongest classifier in the 
ensemble using numerical attributes of the executable file. 
Conclusion 
This paper described in detail the complete process of creating machine learning 
models capable of detecting malware with a high level of precision in a non-isolated 
environment, based on static analysis of a binary PE file. This avoids running the software 
for dynamic research, which is typical for dynamic malware analysis systems in a sandbox.  
A method for representing a binary PE file was chosen. A number of data processing 
techniques have been proposed for data extracted from the executable file that enable 
efficient classification. A feature engineering method has been applied, in which a number of 
features are generated to increase classification precision, based on information about the 
executable file structure and analysis of malicious code.  
An ensemble of classifiers was created on the basis of the well-known ensemble 
learning approach [29], which uses weighted aggregation of forecasts from individual 
classifiers, each of which is tailored to its own feature space. As a result, a much larger 
feature space is covered than each individual classifier could have. 
In turn, a machine learning system can be built based on a trained ensemble of 
classifiers, which can detect malicious code before it is run. 
The code for the software developed over the course of the study can be viewed in the 
Colaboratory interactive development environment by following the link [31]. 
References 
1. Or-Mein O., Nissim N. Dynamic Malware Analysis in the Modern Era – A State of the Art 
Survey. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel. ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 52, 
no. 5, Article 88, 2019. DOI: 10.1145/3329786. 
2. Bazrafshan Z., Hashemi H. A survey on heuristic malware detection techniques. 2013 5th 
Conference on Information and Knowledge Technology (IKT). DOI: 
10.1109/IKT.2013.6620049. 
3. Tony Abou-Assaleh, Nick Cercone, Vlado Keselj, and Ray Sweidan. Detection of new 
malicious code using n-grams signatures In Proceedings of Second Annual Conference on 
Privacy, Security and Trust, pp. 193196, 2004. 
4. W. Li, K. Wang, S. Stolfo, B. Herzog. Fileprints: Identifying file types by n-gram analysis. 
Proc. of the IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security, 2005. 
5. D. Bilar. Statistical structures: Fingerprinting malware for classification and analysis. In 
Blackhat, 2006. 
6. I. Santos, F. Brezo, J. Nieves, Y. K. Penya, B. Sanz, C. Laorden, and P. G. Bringas. Opcode-
sequence-based malware detection, in Proc. 2nd Int. Symp. Eng. Secure Software and Syst. 
(ESSoS), Pisa, Italy, vol. LNCS 5965, pp. 3543, Feb. 34, 2010. 
7. R. Sekar, M. Bendre, D. Bollineni, and Bollineni, R. Needham and M. Abadi, Eds. A fast 
automaton-based method for detecting anomalous program behaviors, in Proc. 2001 IEEE 
Symp. Security and Privacy, IEEE Comput. Soc., Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2001, pp. 144155. 
8. Schultz, M., Eskin, E., Zadok, F., Stolfo. Data mining methods for detection of new malicious 
executables. In: Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2001, 
3849. 
9. Yanfang Ye, Lifei Chen, Dingding Wang, Tao Li, Qingshan Jiang, Min Zhao. SBMDS: an 
interpretable string-based malware detection system using SVM ensemble with bagging, Journal 
in Computer Virology, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 283293, 2009. 
10. A. Shabtai, R. Moskovitch, Y. Elovici, C. Glezer. Detection of malicious code by applying 
machine learning classifiers on static features: A state-of-the-art survey, Information security 
technical report 14, 2009. 
11. Rubin D. Inference and Missing Data. Biometrika. 1976. No.3. 
12. Cheema J. A Review of Missing Data Handling Methods in Education Research. Review of 
Educational Research. 2014. 
13. Enders C. Applied Missing Data Analysis. New York, London, 2010, рp. 56-70.  
14. Daniel T. Larose. Discovering Knowledge in Data: An Introduction to Data Mining. 
15. Abdi H. & Williams L.J. Principal component analysis. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Computational Statistics, 2010, 2 (4): 433–459. arXiv:1108.4372. DOI:10.1002/wics.101. 
16. Luhn, Hans Peter. A Statistical Approach to Mechanized Encoding and Searching of Literary 
Information. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 1957, 1 (4): 309–317. 
DOI:10.1147/rd.14.0309. 
17. Jones K. S. A statistical interpretation of term specificity and its application in retrieval (in 
English.). Journal of Documentation: journal. MCB University: MCB University Press, 2004, 
vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 493-502. ISSN 0022-0418. 
18. J. Salton. Dynamic Information and Library Processing. (In Russian.) Moscow, Mir, 1979. 
19. Portable Executable reader module. Available at: https://pypi.org/project/pefile/ [Accessed 
02.03.2020]. 
20. BS ISO 5725-1. Accuracy (trueness and precision) of measurement methods and results - Part 1: 
General principles and definitions. P.1 (1994). 
21. Sasaki, Y. The truth of the F-measure. School of Computer Science, University of Manchester, 
2007. 
22. Stone, M. Cross-Validatory Choice and Assessment of Statistical Predictions. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological), 1974, 36 (2): 111–147. 
23. Van der Maaten L.J.P., Hinton G.E. Visualizing Data Using t-SNE. Journal of Machine 
Learning Research, 2008, November (vol. 9). 
24. Breiman, L. Random Forests. Machine Learning 45, 5–32, 2001. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010933404324 [Accessed 02.03.2020]. 
25. RandomForestClassifier. Scikit-Learn Machine Learning in Python. Available at: https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.ensemble.RandomForestClassifier.html [Accessed 
12.03.2020]. 
26. Pestudio, Malware Initial Assessment. Available at: https://www.winitor.com/ [Accessed 
12.03.2020]. 
27. Netflix Prize. Available at: https://netflixprize.com/ [Accessed 12.03.2020]. 
28. Aurélien Géron. Hands-On Machine Learning with Scikit-Learn and TensorFlow: Concepts, 
Tools, and Techniques to Build Intelligent Systems. 
29. Zhou Zhihua. Ensemble Methods: Foundations and Algorithms. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2012, 
ISBN 978-1-439-83003-1. 
30. Sharif M., Yegneswaran V., Saidi H., Porras P., Lee W. Eureka: A Framework for Enabling 
Static Malware Analysis. Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, 2008, vol. 5283, pp. 481-500. 
31. Colaboratory. Available at: 
https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1trqaTMLNVuQSzN2dQIkpySkvqax9X0-
a?usp=sharing [Accessed 19.06.2020] 
